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D4OVLIN1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 11 CR 114 (MGC) V. 5 XING LIN, 6 Defendant. JURY TRIAL 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. April 24, 2013 9 10:34 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. MIRIAM GOLDMAN CEDARBAUM, 12 District Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES 15 PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 PETER M. SKINNER JENNIFER E. BURNS 18 Assistant United States Attorneys JOEL S. COHEN 19 Attorney for Defendant 20 ALSO PRESENT: BRENDA CHEN, Fuchow Interpreter 21 DANIEL YANG, Fuchow Interpreter LILY LAU, Fuchow Interpreter 22 DANIEL CHAN, Fuchow Interpreter JESSICA CHACE, Paralegal 23 TIMOTHY VARIAN, Special Agent, HSI JIAYING WANG, Legal Assistant 24 25

(Trial resumed) 1 (In open court; jury not present) 2 3 THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. Let's get the jury. 4 5 MR. COHEN: Your Honor, I have a motion. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. COHEN: I indicated yesterday at the close of the day that I would move for a mistrial this morning after I had 8 9 an opportunity to review in writing the government's rebuttal 10 summation. I now make that motion for the reasons I'm about to 11 12 state, and because of my belief that the government's summation 13 amounted to, in essence, an ad hominem attack on defense 14 counsel, and, for that and other reasons, deprived Mr. Lin of his right to a fair trial. And I just want to review very 15 16 briefly the items that Mr. Skinner mentioned during his 17 rebuttal that I think cumulatively add up to this deprivation. 18 Initially, he indicated that -- on Page 999, he "He's not saying that they were mistaken, he's saying 19 stated: 20 that they lied. Seriously, that's what he's saying. 21 audacity of this defense." 22 I objected; your Honor sustained that objection. 23 In two further sentences later, he says: "Let's take a hard look at this alternative universe," suggesting that my 24

summation came out of the twilight zone.

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I objected to that; there was no ruling.

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A couple pages later, on Page 1003, at Line 15, he stated: "Is defense really saying that in the wake of this horrific murder, these three people came together and decided to frame Xing Lin because they thought -- "

And I objected because I had not suggested during my summation that they had come together to create a frame, and I thought it was improper.

You just said to move on.

Most egregious, I think, was that during the charge conference, your Honor specifically made a finding that Dong Jai, Cash, was not a witness that was available to both sides, and that your Honor would not charge as such.

THE COURT: Equally available witnesses.

MR. COHEN: Right.

And despite your Honor's very clear instruction that was the case, Mr. Skinner said at Page 1005: "It's our burden; he doesn't need to do anything. That said, he knows where Cash is.

"Objection.

"The defense attorney said --

"Objection.

"The defense in this case has repeatedly suggested that everybody in Chinatown knows where Cash is."

And your Honor said: "Just a moment. Move on to

something else."

THE COURT: Well, I denied the application to include in the charge equally available.

MR. COHEN: But, your Honor, I don't think that it's -- first of all, that's burden-shifting for him to suggest that I had to call any witness, much less a witness that your Honor indicated was not a witness available equally to both sides.

And because of the burden-shifting aspect of it and because your Honor made a finding that he wasn't equally available to both sides, I don't see how the government gets to stand up and says that he is equally available to both sides.

It's not fair.

Moreover, after I specifically said, specifically said that the prosecutors, the agents in this case, had not gotten together to frame anybody, had not done anything underhanded, had not done anything improper, and that they had been sold a bill of goods by their witnesses, Mr. Skinner said: "Mr. Cohen is a nice guy; he doesn't want to openly accuse the people at the front table of fabricating the case. He went out of his way to say he didn't think that we made any promises to any of these witnesses. But isn't he really saying that the front table was a part of this?

"Objection.

"That we're relying --

"Objection. 1 2 "That we're relying --3 "I've heard your objection." A few lines later: "What did the agents and 4 5 prosecutors in this case have to motivate them to suborn 6 perjury, to risk their careers? 7 "Objection." Your Honor indicated that we shouldn't do much 8 9 objecting during closings, and I agreed with you. But I felt 10 that what was being said was so egregious, that it needed to be 11 addressed promptly. 12 He then vouched for those witnesses --13 THE COURT: Well, you have certainly preserved your 14 objections. 15 MR. COHEN: I understand. He then vouched for his witnesses by stating that they 16 17 had testified truthfully. 18 Moreover, on Page 1007 at Line 18, Mr. Skinner said: "If it's all a lie, how does the defendant explain the evidence 19 20 that couldn't have been fabricated? How does he explain his 21 car at the scene? How does he explain his documents? 22 "Burden shifting, your Honor. Objection. 23 "I think you should move on to something else." 24 On Page 1009 --25 THE COURT: Well, I intend to tell the jury very

clearly who has the burden of proof. I think that that will 1 cure a lot of your objections. 2 Well, Judge --3 MR. COHEN: 4 THE COURT: But, in any event, I hear what you are telling me, and I reserve decision. 5 6 MR. COHEN: There's just one or two things I want to 7 add, if I may. 8 THE COURT: Very well. 9 MR. COHEN: At Page 1015: "First, keep in mind that 10 dailo/follower relationship. The dailo is on top; he tells the followers what to do." 11 12 Me: "Judge, this is improper rebuttal. I'm sorry, 13 it's just improper rebuttal." 14 On Page 1018, he makes reference to Oh-Yang and why he 15 asked -- why Mr. Lin asked Oh-Yang to go back and get the car. "Evidence that's corroborated by independent phone 16 17 records." I again say: "Judge, again, I never mentioned Oh-Yang 18 during my summation; I don't see how this is proper rebuttal, 19 20 I'm sorry." 21 Your Honor says: "I think that that was not. We're 22 going to strike that. Not for that reason, because of the

together did deprive Mr. Lin of his Sixth Amendment right to a

I think, Judge, that all of those things viewed

absence of evidence as to what happened."

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D4OVI,TN1 fair trial. I think if your Honor is reserving decision on the 1 mistrial motion and intends to take care of this by instructing 2 3 the jury that what the lawyers say is not evidence, that your 4 Honor should make some specific references to what Mr. --5 THE COURT: I understand that's your view. I'm sorry, your Honor? 6 MR. COHEN: 7 THE COURT: Off the record. 8 (Off record) 9 MR. COHEN: And finally, Judge, if the Court declines 10 to make specific instructions to the jury on these things, and 11 declines to at this time grant a mistrial motion, then I would 12 ask for five minutes surrebuttal. 13

I'm sorry, that I deny. THE COURT:

MR. COHEN: Fine.

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THE COURT: That I deny.

Let's get the jury.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, members of the jury.

We are now at the stage of the trial at which you undertake your final function as jurors. And here you perform one of the most sacred obligations of citizenship, which is to decide the questions of fact in this case.

You are to discharge this final duty in an attitude of complete fairness and impartiality. And, as I emphasized when you were selected as jurors, you must have no bias or prejudice

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for or against the government or the defendant.

This case is important. It is important to the defendant, who is charged with serious crimes. It is equally important to the government for the enforcement of the criminal law is a matter of prime concern to the community.

Let me add, the fact that the government is a party entitles it to no greater consideration than that accorded to any other party to a litigation. By the same token, it is entitled to no less consideration.

I told you at the very start of the trial that your principal function during the taking of testimony and admission of evidence would be to listen carefully to the evidence and observe each witness who testifies. It has been obvious to me that you have faithfully discharged this duty. Your interest never flagged, and you followed the evidence with close attention. I ask you to give me the same careful attention as I instruct you on the law.

You are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. You determine the weight of the evidence. You appraise the credibility of the witnesses. You draw the reasonable inferences from the evidence. And you resolve such conflicts as there may be in the evidence.

You have now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the lawyers. As I've already told you, anything that counsel either for the government or

defense may have said with respect to matters in evidence, whether during the trial, in a question, in argument, or in closing arguments, is not to be substituted for your own recollection of the evidence. So too anything that I may have said during the trial or may refer to during the course of these instructions as to any matter in evidence is not to be taken in place of your own independent recollection. You, and you alone, are the judges of the facts. And my duty is to instruct you on the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law, and apply them to the facts as you determine them. The result will be the verdict.

You must accept the law as I give it to you. If any attorney has stated a legal principle different from any that I state in my instructions, it is my instructions that you must follow. Needless to say, a personal view of any of the lawyers in this case is entirely irrelevant and would be and should be totally disregarded. But you should not single out any one instruction as alone stating the law. You should consider my instructions as a whole when you retire to deliberate in the jury room. It is not your function to consider the wisdom of any rule that I state, regardless of any opinion that you may have as to what the law is or what the law ought to be. It would violate your sworn duty to have based a verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I give you.

At the beginning of the trial, I referred to certain

principles of law which apply in every criminal case. I repeat those principles now. I remind you that the indictment, any indictment, is not evidence. An indictment is no more than a formal method of accusing a person of having committed a crime. You must give no weight whatsoever to the fact that an indictment has been returned against the defendant.

The defendant has pleaded not guilty. In doing so, he denies each and every allegation against him. That means that the government has the burden of proving the charges against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts; it remains on the government throughout the entire trial.

Under our system of law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him. This presumption of innocence was in the defendant's favor at the start of the trial, continued in the defendant's favor throughout the entire trial, is in the defendant's favor even as I instruct you now, and remains in the defendant's favor during the course of your deliberations in the jury room. It is removed only if and when you are satisfied that the government has sustained its burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

What is a reasonable doubt? The words almost define themselves. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense and arising from the evidence, or lack of evidence. It is a doubt

that a reasonable person would have after carefully weighing all of the evidence. It is a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a manner of importance in his or her personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character, that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.

A reasonable doubt is not a caprice or a whim, it is not a speculation or suspicion. It is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty. And it is not sympathy. In a criminal case, the burden is at all times upon the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The test is reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict.

If, after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendant based on the evidence or lack of evidence presented during the trial, you must acquit.

On the other hand, if, after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you are satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you should vote to convict the defendant.

I should note, each of the five counts in the indictment charges a separate crime, and you must consider each count separately.

Count One charges the defendant with conspiring to violate the federal racketeering statute, commonly known as RICO. This means that the defendant has been charged with conspiracy to conduct or participate in the affairs of an

enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

Count Two charges that the defendant participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically, murder, conspiracy to commit murder, extortion, extortion conspiracy, and operating illegal gambling businesses.

Count Three charges the defendant with murder, and aiding and abetting the murder of Chan Qin Zhou and Mei Ying Li by using a firearm during and in relation to extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion.

Count Four charges the defendant with extortion of the owners of a bus company.

Count Five charges the defendant with conspiring to extort the owners of a bus company.

I should note that the indictment alleges that the defendant had a nickname, Ding Pa. Use of a nickname is not evidence of criminal activity.

Even though extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion are charged in the last two counts of the indictment, Counts Four and Five, I am going to begin by explaining those charges first. This is because the law of extortion is also

relevant to the crimes charged in Counts One, Two, and Three.

Extortion is a violation of the Hobbs Act, which is Section 1951 of the criminal code. That statute provides as relevant here whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce for the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by extortion or attempts to do so is guilty of a crime. Extortion is defined as obtaining another person's property or money with his consent when the consent is induced through the wrongful use or threatened use of force, violence, or fear.

Count Four reads as follows:

"From in or about March 2002, up to and including in or about December 2009, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, the defendant, and others, known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did commit and attempt to commit extortion as that term is defined in Title 18, which is the United States Criminal Code, Section 1951(b)(2), by obtaining money and property from and with the consent of another person, to wit, individuals who owned a bus company, which consent would have been and was induced by the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear, and thereby did obstruct, delay, and affect commerce, and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce as that term is defined in Title 18, which is the criminal code of the United States, Section 1951(b)(3); to wit, it is charged that

Lin extorted and attempted to extort individuals who owned a bus company for money, that is, extort for money of individuals who owned a bus company."

I should note the following about extortion:

Extortion is a violation of the Hobbs Act, which, as I've told you, is Section 1951 of the United States Criminal Code. That statute provides as relevant here, and I quote:

"Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by extortion or attempts so to do is guilty of a crime."

Extortion is defined as obtaining another person's property or money with his consent when the consent is induced through the wrongful use or threatened use of force, violence, or fear.

Count Four reads as follows:

"From in or about March 2002, up to and including in or about December 2009, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, the defendant, and others, known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did commit and attempt to commit extortion by obtaining money and property with the consent of another person, to wit, individuals who owned a bus company, which consent would have been and was induced by the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear, and thereby did obstruct,

delay, and affect commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce as that term is defined in Section 1951(b)(3) of the United States Criminal Code; to wit, Lin extorted and attempted to extort individuals who owned a bus company." That is, Lin extorted and attempted to extort money

from individuals who owned a bus company.

In order to find that the defendant committed extortion, you must find that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following four elements:

First, that the defendant obtained money or property from another person with that person's consent; second, that the defendant induced that person's consent by the wrongful use or threat of force, violence, or fear; third, that interstate commerce was delayed, obstructed, or affected; and, fourth, that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully.

The first element the government must prove and that you must find for the charge that the defendant committed extortion is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly obtained money or property from another person with that person's consent. The term "property" includes money, as well as tangible and intangible things of value.

Now, if and only if you find that the defendant obtained money or property from another person, with that person's consent, you must then determine whether the defendant obtained the money or property through the wrongful use of

actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of physical injury or economic harm. You must determine whether the defendant obtained the money or property by using any of those unlawful means. It is not necessary that the government prove that force, violence, and fear were all threatened or used. The government satisfies its burden if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that any of these methods were threatened or used.

You should give the words "actual or threatened force, violence, or fear" their common and ordinary meaning. A threat may be either implicit or explicit. The force or violence might be aimed at a third person or at causing economic rather than physical harm.

In determining whether the defendant used fear to obtain money or property, you must determine whether a victim experienced anxiety, concern, or worry over expected personal harm or economic loss. These are matters which require you to consider the victim's state of mind at the time of the defendant's actions. It is, as with other matters, involving state of mind. You cannot look inside a person's mind. But a careful consideration of the circumstances should enable you to decide whether fear was the victim's state of mind. Fear need not be a consequence of an implicit or explicit threat. The wrongful use of fear requires that the defendant create or instill fear, or use or exploit existing fear with the specific

purpose of inducing another to part with property.

The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a victim's fear, and did or said something to wrongfully exploit that fear. If you decide that the defendant obtained money or property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, you must then decide whether in doing so the defendant affected interstate commerce.

Interstate commerce means commerce between two or more states, such as the movement of goods, services, or money from one state to another. It's not necessary to find that the effect on interstate commerce was substantial, nor is it necessary to find that the effect on interstate commerce was adverse. A minimal effect is sufficient, so long as the activities of the defendant affected interstate commerce in some way. If you decide that there was any effect on interstate commerce, that is enough to satisfy this element. It is not necessary to find that the defendant knew that his acts would affect interstate commerce or that he intended to affect such commerce.

Finally, in order to find the defendant guilty of

Count Four of the indictment, you must find that the defendant

acted knowingly and willfully with respect to the first and

second elements. "Knowingly" means to act voluntarily and

deliberately, rather than mistakenly or inadvertently or

accidentally. A person acts willfully who acts with the intent to do something that the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose, to violate or deliberately disregard the law. To act willfully, a defendant need not know that he is breaking any particular law; he needs only to be aware of the generally unlawful nature of his conduct.

Knowledge and intent exist in the mind. And again, since it is not possible to look inside a person's mind, the only way to arrive at a decision on knowledge and intent is for you to take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence.

Count Five of the indictment charges conspiracy to commit extortion. Conspiring to commit extortion is also a violation of the Hobbs Act, Section 1951 of the criminal code of the United States. That statute provides as relevant whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by conspiring to do extortion is guilty of a crime.

Before I instruct you on the elements of a conspiracy to violate the extortion statute, let me say a few words about the difference between the conspiracy charged in Count Five, and the extortion charged in Count Four on which I have just instructed you.

The crime of conspiracy is separate and distinct from the actual violation of the law, which the law refers to as a

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substantive crime, the actual violation. Count Four charges a substantive violation of the extortion statute; that is, it charges that the defendant actually committed extortion. Count Five charges the defendant with a different crime; that is, it charges him with conspiring or agreeing to commit extortion.

A conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership, an agreement, of two or more persons who join together to commit one or more crimes. You may find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy even if the conspiracy was not actually -the object of the conspiracy was not actually committed, that is, if the conspiracy was not successful.

Congress has deemed it appropriate to make conspiracy standing alone a separate crime, even if the conspiracy is not successful. In order to find that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in Count Five, you must find that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt both of the following two elements:

First, that at some time during the period alleged in the indictment, the defendant entered into an agreement with at least one other person to violate the federal extortion statute; and, second, that the defendant unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully participated in that agreement.

The first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that at some time during the period of March 2002 to December 2009, the defendant and at $1 \parallel 1$

least one other person entered into the unlawful agreement charged in Count Five of the indictment. In order for the government to satisfy this element, you need not find that the agreement or its object was written down or expressed in specific words.

The government is not required to show that two or more people sat around a table and entered into a solemn pact orally or in writing, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the law and spelling out all of the details. But the government must show that the conspirators came to a mutual understanding to commit extortion by means of a joint plan.

In a very real sense, in the context of conspiracy cases, actions often speak louder than words. If, upon consideration of all the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed to work with at least one other person in furtherance of the object charged in the indictment in Count Five, then proof of the existence of a conspiracy is established.

According to the indictment, the object of the conspiracy charged in Count Five was to commit extortion. I have just explained to you the elements of extortion. If you find that the defendant and at least one other person agreed to accomplish that object, the unlawful purpose element will be satisfied.

The second element that the government must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to prove Count Five of the indictment is that the defendant unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully, participated in a conspiracy with at least one other person.

I've already explained what it means to act knowingly and willfully, and that knowledge and intent exists in the mind. Again, it is not possible to look inside a person's mind. So the only way to arrive at a decision on knowledge and intent is for you to take all of the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence into consideration. But I want to caution you that mere knowledge or acquiescence without participation in the unlawful agreement is not sufficient. A defendant's mere presence at the scene of the alleged crime does not make him a member of the conspiracy charged.

I turn back then to Count Two of the indictment, rather than Count One, because I think it will be easier to understand both Count Two and Count One if we start with Count Two.

In Count Two of the indictment, the defendant is charged with violating the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, which is commonly known as RICO, R-I-C-O, a statute which is found at Section 1962(c) of the United States Criminal Code. That statute provides, in pertinent part, and I quote:

"It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or

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associated with any enterprise engaged in or the activities which affect interstate or foreign commerce to conduct or participate directly or indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."

Count Two of the indictment -- well, initially, let me say that the phrase "racketeering activity" is specifically defined by Congress in the RICO statute to mean certain criminal acts, and is not to be thought of as you might in an everyday context. Consequently, you must put aside any preconceived ideas about the phrase "racketeering activities" in your deliberations, and concentrate only on its meaning in this statute.

And the racketeering activities that are charged in this case are set out in Count Two of the indictment.

Count Two of the indictment charges that: At all times relevant to this indictment, Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, the defendant, and others, known and unknown, were members and associates of an organized crime enterprise led by Lin.

The Ding Pa Organization engaged in crimes including murder, manslaughter, assault, operating illegal gambling businesses, extortion, and other crimes.

The Ding Pa Organization constituted an enterprise as that term is defined in Section 1961, Sub 4, of Title 18 of the United States Code. That is, a group of individuals associated

in fact. The enterprise was engaged in and its activities affected interstate commerce. The Ding Pa Organization was an organized criminal group based primarily in the Chinatown section of Manhattan that operated in the Southern and Eastern District of New York and elsewhere. This is the charge in the indictment. The Ding Pa Organization constituted an ongoing organization whose members functioned as a continuing unit for a common purpose of achieving the objectives of the exercise. This enterprise was engaged in and its activities affected interstate commerce.

This is a long count.

It is alleged in the indictment, in Count Two, that Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, was a member and associate of the enterprise which the government calls Ding Pa Organization, and was, at various times relevant to the indictment, the leader of the organization. In that capacity, Lin participated in the operation and management of the enterprise, and participated in unlawful and other activities in furtherance of the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, and profited from the enterprise's affairs.

Count Two also charges that the purposes of the enterprise included enriching the leaders, members, and associates in the Ding Pa Organization through criminal activities, preserving, protecting and augmenting the power, territory, and financial profits of the Ding Pa Organization,

its leaders, members, and associates, through the use of intimidation, violence, and threats of physical and economic harm, and keeping victims and citizens in fear of the Ding Pa Organization, its leaders, members, and associates, by committing and threatening to commit physical violence, and by causing and threatening to cause physical and economic harm.

The racketeering acts set out in Count Two of the indictment, murder and conspiracy to commit murder, that is charged as Racketeering Act 1.

Racketeering Act 2 is charged as follows:

From in or about March 2002, up to and including in or about December 9th, 2009, Ding Pa, the defendant, and others, known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed together to commit extortion, as that term is defined in the United States Criminal Code, by obtaining money and property from and with the consent of other persons, to wit, individuals who owned and operated a bus company.

Racketeering Act 3 is charged as follows:

In or about 1996, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, the defendant, and others, known and unknown, willfully and knowingly did conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, and own all and part of an illegal gambling business, to wit, a mahjong parlor, in violation of New York State Penal Law, and which business involved five and more persons who conducted, financed,

managed, supervised, directed, and owned all and part of it, and which business had been and remained in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of 30 days, and had gross revenues of \$2,000 in a single day, all in violation of Section 1955 of the United States Criminal Code.

Racketeering Act 4, which is charged in Count Two of the indictment, charges that:

From in or about 1996, up to and including in or about 1997, Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, willfully and knowingly did conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, and own an illegal gambling business, to wit, a gambling parlor where tien len and other card games were played, in violation of New York State Penal Law, and which business involved five and more persons who conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed, and owned, all and part of it, which had been and remained in substantially continuous business — excuse me, continuous operation for a period in excess of 30 days, and had gross revenues of \$2,000 in a single day.

Now, there is a fifth racketeering act charged in Count Two of the indictment as part of the activities of the RICO enterprise, that from in or about 1999, up to and including in or about 2002, the defendant, Ding Pa, willfully and knowingly did conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct and own, all and part of an illegal gambling business, to wit, a gambling parlor where tien len and other card games were

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Now, in order to prove the defendant quilty of the crime charged in Count Two, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following five elements:

First, that on or about the dates charged in the indictment, the enterprise alleged in the indictment existed.

Second, that the enterprise affected interstate commerce.

Third, that the defendant was employed by or associated with that enterprise.

Fourth, that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

And, fifth, that the defendant conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise through that pattern of racketeering activity.

The first element that the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is the existence of the enterprise charged in the indictment.

An enterprise within the meaning of the RICO law does not have to be a legal entity, such as a partnership, a corporation, or an association. Under RICO, an enterprise can be a group of people who informally associate together for the common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.

In addition to having a common purpose, this group of people must have an ongoing organization, either formal or informal, and it must have a core of personnel who function as a continuing unit. This group may be organized for a legitimate and lawful purpose or for an unlawful purpose.

Here, in this case, or so the indictment alleges, the enterprise charged to have existed is what the government calls the Ding Pa Organization. Just because the indictment charges that the Ding Pa Organization was an enterprise, does not establish that there was an enterprise within the meaning of the law. That is for you to decide.

The first question that confronts you is has the government proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the enterprise charged in the indictment existed, that there was such an enterprise. In essence, the government contends that a group of individuals which it calls the Ding Pa Organization associated together in order to make money and achieve other objectives through a pattern of racketeering. If you find that there was, in fact, a group of people characterized by, one, a common purpose, two, an ongoing formal or informal organization

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or structure, and, three, core personnel who functioned as a continuing unit, then you may find that an enterprise existed.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: If you find that the enterprise charged in the indictment existed, you must also determine whether this enterprise continued in essentially unchanged form during substantially the period charge in the indictment. This does not mean that everyone involved has to be the same.

Essentially the core of the enterprise has to have been the same throughout.

In sum, your first task is to determine whether the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt that, first, the existence of the he price charged in the indictment. If your answer to that question is yes, then you will proceed to consider the other elements of Count Two. If your answer is no, that is to say if you have a reasonable doubt about the existence of the enterprise charged in Count Two, then you must acquit the defendant on this charge. The second element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the activities of the enterprise had some affect on interstate commerce. I have already discussed what it means to have an affect on interstate commerce in connection with Count Four and you should apply those instructions here as well.

Now, if you conclude that the existence of the enterprise and the affect on interstate commerce has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, your next task will be to determine whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was associated with that

enterprise.

Now, for Count Two, the fourth element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. A defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity if he commits at least two acts of racketeering within 10 years of each other and the two acts are sufficiently related to continue in criminal activity of the enterprise to constitute a pattern. A RICO pattern may not be established without some showing that the racketeering acts are interrelated and that there is continuity or a threat of continuity in the activities of the organization.

It is important to note that isolated acts of racketeering do not form a pattern. A pattern is an arrangement or order of things or activity. It is not the number of acts, but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that renders them ordered or arranged.

Criminal conduct forms a pattern only if it embraces acts of racketeering that have the same or similar purposes or results and participants and victims or methods of commission that show a relationship between the acts of racketeering. The the racketeering acts must be interrelated. The acts of racketeering must also be a part of a continuing course of conduct where the enterprise is an entity whose business is

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racketeering activity. An act performed in furtherance of that business automatically carries with it the threat of continued racketeering activities. If and only if you find that the defendant committed at least two acts of racketeering, which were part of such related and continuing criminal activity, then you may find that the the government has proved that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

Further, it is not enough that all of you believe that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by committing at least two acts of racketeering. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that he engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by committing at least two particular acts of racketeering. That is, you may not find the defendant guilty if some of you think that only Acts

Racketeering One and Two were committed by the defendant and the rest of you think that Acts Three and Four were committed by the defendant. There must be at least two specific acts of racketeering that all of you agree were committed by the defendant in order to find that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

I will instruct you on the specific racketeering acts charged in the indictment in a moment, but before I do that I will turn to the fifth and final element of the substantive RICO charge which is Count Two of the indictment. If you find that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering

activity, then you must consider the fifth and final element of the RICO offense charged in Count Two. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise through that pattern of racketeering activity. In other words, it is not enough that there be an enterprise and that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities. More is required. To conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise means that the defendant must have played some part in the operation or management of the enterprise.

The government must also prove that there is a meaningful connection between the defendant's charged acts of racketeering and the enterprise. The government must prove that the acts of racketeering were in some way related to the affairs of the enterprise or that the defendant was able to commit these acts solely by virtue of his position or involvement in the affairs of the enterprise.

I will now review with you the six specific acts of racketeering which are charged in Count Two of the indictment. You need only find that the defendant committed one of the crimes charged within a single racketeering act in the indictment in order to find the entire racketeering act proved. However, I remind you that you must all agree on which particular crime the defendant committed in order to find that he committed the racketeering act. Again, if some of you find

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one part and the others of you find another part, you are not all finding the same act and you may not find the defendant guilty under those circumstances.

Now, the first racketeering act, Racketeering Act One in the indictment charges the defendant with murdering and conspiring to murder change Chan Qin Zhou on or about July 10th, 2004 in violation of New York State law. As I just instructed you, the violation of any one of the charged statutes alone constitutes the commission of Racketeering Act One. Under New York State Penal Law 125.25, a person is guilty of murder in the second degree when with intent to cause the death of another person he causes the death of such person or of a third person. In order to find that the defendant committed this charge of murder, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both of the following two elements: First, that on or about July 30th, 2004, the defendant caused the death of Chan Qin Zhou, and second that the defendant did so with the intent to cause the death of Chan Qin Zhou.

Now, the term "intent" under New York law means conscious objective or purpose. Thus, a person acts with intent to cause the death of another when that person's conscious objective or purpose is to cause the death of another. Under New York State Penal Law Sections 105.15 and 125.25, a person is guilty of a conspiracy to commit murder when with intent that the murder be committed he agrees with

one or more persons to engage in or cause the commission of the murder. Accordingly, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the following three elements — that it must prove all of the three following elements: First, that on or about July 10th, 2004 the defendant agreed with one or more persons to murder Chan Qin Zhou; second, that the defendant did so with the intent that the murder be committed; and third that the defendant or a person with whom he agreed committed the murder of Chan Qin Zhou. I've already instructed you on the conduct constituting murder and the meaning of intent under New York law and you should follow any instructions here as well.

Racketeering Act Two charges the defendant with extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion of the owners of a bus company. From in or about March 2002 to December 2009 in violation of federal law as I've already instructed you, any one violation constitutes the commission of Racketeering Act Two. That is, violation of the extortion statute. I've already instructed you on the elements of extortion under federal law in Count Four. You should follow my instructions here as well. I've also already instructed you on the elements of conspiracy commit extortion under federal law in Count Five. You should follow my instructions here as well.

Now, Racketeering Act Three charges the defendant with operating an illegal gambling parlor, specifically a Mahjong

parlor, in or about 1996 in violation of federal law. Section 1955 of the criminal code of the United States provides as here relevant "Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business is guilty of a crime.

In order to find that the defendant committed this charge of illegal gambling, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following three elements: First, that the gambling business charge violated New York State law; second that the gambling business was in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of 30 days or had gross revenue of \$2,000 or more in any one day; and third that five or more persons including the defendant knowingly conducted, finance, managed, supervised, directed or owned all or part of such business.

Now I am going to explain illegal gambling. The first element the government must prove beyond a reason doubt is that the gambling business charged in Count Two of the indictment violated one of two New York State Penal Laws, but only one law has to be violated. Again, you must all agree on which law it is. You must be unanimous as to the law that was violated. Let me begin by defining certain terms that are used in the New York criminal statutes. Under New York State Penal Law Section 225 gambling occurs and I quote "When a person stakes or risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or

of future contingent event not under his control or influence upon an agreement or understanding that he will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome. A contest of chance is any game in which the outcome depends in a material degree on chance. Something of value includes money."

New York State Penal Law Section 225.05 makes it a crime to "knowingly profit from unlawful gambling activity."

Profiting from gambling activity means when a person other than as a player accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person whereby he anticipates or is to participate in the proceeds of gambling activity. "Unlawful" simply means contrary to law.

Under New York law with certain exceptions not applicable here gambling activity is not authorized by law. Indeed is contrary to law.

Finally, a person knowingly profits from unlawful gambling activity when he is aware that he is profiting from gambling activity. New York State Penal Law Section 225.10 makes it a crime to "knowingly profit from unlawful gambling activity by engaging in bookmaking to the extent that a person receives or accepts in any one day more than five bets totaling more than \$5,000." I've already explained what it mean to knowingly profit from unlawful gambling activity. "Bookmaking" mean unlawfully accepting bets from members of the public as a business rather than in a casual or personal fashion upon

the outcome of future contingent events.

I think we all should stand up and stretch for a minute before I continue.

> Judge, may we have a five-minute break? MR. COHEN:

THE COURT: Very well. We'll take a five-minute break. I should comfort you with the thought that I will give you a copy of this charge to take with you into the jury room, but I first want to read it to you so that you will hear it as well as read it. Very well. We'll take a five-minute recess.

(Jury excused)

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(In open court; jury not present)

MR. COHEN: Two things I want to bring to your Honor's attention now. I didn't want to interrupt. I think you read Count Four twice to the jury inadvertently. I would ask that you instruct them not to give any particular attention to that count, that it was inadvertently read twice.

THE COURT: Let me ask the court reporter, is that true?

MR. COHEN: The government and I agree that you read Count Four twice.

MR. SKINNER: The indictment twice, your Honor.

MR. COHEN: The indictment.

THE COURT: The indictment but not the charge.

MR. COHEN: It was lengthy, the second.

THE COURT: What difference does that make?

MR. COHEN: He don't want the jury to think they should give any special emphasis to that.

THE COURT: Do you think by the end of this charge they will even remember?

MR. COHEN: I don't know, Judge, but I have to protect the record.

The second thing is that the homicides occurred on July 30th, and both times that you referenced them you said they occurred on July 10th. I think that might confuse the jury.

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D4o6lin2 Charge MS. BURNS: We had that as well, your Honor. MR. SKINNER: You said July 30th once and July 10th twice. MS. BURNS: It was correct in the written charge. It was just spoken as to 10th. THE COURT: Thank you. (Recess)

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(In open court; jury present)

THE COURT: You may all be seated. We're coming down the home stretch.

The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the gambling business was either in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of 30 days or that the gambling business had gross revenues of \$2,000 or more in one day. Either one is sufficient as long as you are in agreement as to which one has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The government is not required to prove that the business operated on an every day basis throughout the entire period alleged. Instead, the government must prove that over some period in excess of 30 days the gambling business was conducted with sufficient regularity that it existed as an ongoing business rather than a casual activity. The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the business was in substantially continuous operation. It is for to you determine the specific period when the business was in substantially continuous operation. If you find that the period was longer than 30 days, then you should consider the third element.

Another way the government can prove the second element is by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the gambling business had gross revenues of \$2,000 or more in any one day. Gross revenue means the total amount wagered in one

day regardless of how much was paid out to betters as winnings. The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the business had gross revenues of 2,000 or more in any one day. If you find that gross revenues were equal to or greater than \$2,000 on any one day, then you should go on to consider the third element of illegal gambling. The third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that five or more persons, including the defendant, knowingly conducted, financed, managed supervised, directed, or owned the gamble business during the period when you found it was in substantially continuous operation or had gross revenues of \$2,000 or more in one day. The terms "finance," "managed," "supervised," "directed," and "owned" should be given their every day ordinary meaning.

However, I would like to explain the term "conducted" in more detail. To conduct a gambling business means to perform any act, function or duty which is necessary or helpful in the regular operation of the business. Five or more people, including the defendant must have participated during the period that you found that the gambling business or that you find if you do that the gambling business was in substantially continuous operation or had gross revenue of \$2,000 or more in one day. The government does not have to prove that all five were engaged at any particular time in conducting the business as long as it proves that all five participated in the business

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during the period you identified. It is not required that all five be charged in the indictment.

Each of the five persons must have knowingly participated in the business. This means that each of them knew that they were involved in conducting a gambling business and were not involved by accident, negligence, or mistake. The government does not have to prove that the defendant or any others knew that the gambling business was illegal.

Now, Racketeering Act Four of Count Two charges the defendant with operating an illegal gambling parlor, a Tien Lin or 13 card parlor from in or about 1996 to in or about 1997 in violation of federal law. I just instructed you on the elements of illegal gambling under federal law. You should follow those instructions here as well.

Racketeering Act Five charges, that is Racketeering

Act Five in Count Two, charges the defendant with operating an illegal gambling parlor, a Tien Lin or 13 Card parlor — Tien

Lin is 13 Card in Chinese — from in or about 1999 to in or about 2002 in violation of federal law. I've already instructed you on the elements of illegal gambling under federal law. You should follow my instructions here as well.

Now, we come to Count One of the indictment, which charges the defendant with conspiracy to violate the RICO statute. This means that the defendant has been charged with agreeing to conduct or participate in the affairs of an

enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(d) of the United States Criminal Code provides that it shall unlawful for any person to conspire to violate the RICO statute. I've already read part of Count One. I will give you a copy of the indictment to take into the jury room so you can read it as well. Before I instruct you on the elements of a conspiracy to violate the RICO statute, let me say a few words about the difference between the conspiracy charge in Count One and the RICO charge contained in Count Two on which I've already instructed you.

As I instructed you earlier in the context of Count Five, a conspiracy to commit a crime is an entirely separate and distinct offense from the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy. Count Two charges a substantive violation of the RICO statute. That is, it charges the defendant with actually having participated in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

Count One charges the defendant with a different crime. That is, it charges him with conspiring or agreeing to participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

A RICO conspiracy is never simply an agreement to commit predicate acts that allegedly form a pattern of racketeering nor is it merely an agreement to join in a particular enterprise. Rather, it is an agreement to conduct

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or to participate in the conduct of a charged enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.

I've already explained the law of conspiracy in my instructions to Count Five and you should follow those instructions here as well except of course Count Five involves a conspiracy to violate the federal extortion statute and Count One charges a conspiracy to violate the federal RICO statute.

I will now provide you with additional instructions specific to the RICO conspiracy charged in Count One.

In order to prove a defendant guilty of conspiracy to violate the RICO statute as charged in Count One, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following four elements: First, that an enterprise was established as alleged in the indictment.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: Second, that the enterprise affected interstate commerce; third, that the defendant was associated with or employed by the enterprise; and, fourth, that the defendant knowingly and willfully agreed with at least one other person to participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

The first three elements of Count One are very similar to the first three elements of Count Two, which I've already instructed you. However, they are different in an important respect. Unlike Count Two, for purposes of Count One, the government is not required to prove that the alleged enterprise was actually established — this is a conspiracy charge — or that the defendant was actually employed by or associated with the enterprise, or that the enterprise actually affected interstate commerce. Rather, because the agreement to commit a RICO offense is the essence of the RICO conspiracy offense charged in Count One, the government need only prove that if the conspiracy offense were completed as contemplated, that the enterprise would be established, that the defendant would be employed or associated with the enterprise, and that the enterprise would affect interstate commerce.

Of course, if you find that the alleged enterprise was actually established, the first element would be met.

Likewise, if you find that the defendant was actually employed by or associated with the enterprise, and that the enterprise

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actually affected interstate commerce, then the second and third elements would be met.

I turn now to the fourth element, the agreement.

To prove the defendant quilty of the crime charged in Count One, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy charged. This means that in order to meet its burden of proof, the government must show that the defendant agreed to participate directly or indirectly in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. You may find -- but need not find -- that by actually committing two or more racketeering acts, the defendant has shown that he agreed to participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. You may also find -- but need not find -- that the defendant agreed to participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity if you find that he agreed personally to commit two or more racketeering acts to further the affairs of the enterprise.

The government is not, however, required to prove that the defendant actually committed or agreed to commit two or more racketeering acts in order to find that this element has Instead, the focus on this element is on the defendant's agreement to participate in the objective of an enterprise, to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity,

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and not on the defendant's commission or agreement to commit the individual criminal acts. Thus, the government must prove that the defendant entered into the charged RICO conspiracy, and participated in some manner in the overall objective of the conspiracy, and that the conspiracy involved the commission of at least two racketeering acts.

I will now review the predicate acts that the government alleges were committed or agreed to be committed as part of the RICO conspiracy, all of which are listed in the indictment.

As I just explained, the government is not required to prove either that the defendant agreed to himself commit two of these acts, or that he actually committed such acts, only that the defendant conspired to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the alleged enterprise. However, proof that the defendant himself agreed to or did commit such acts may be used by you to conclude that the defendant agreed to participate in the conduct of the alleged enterprise.

Because the substantive RICO crime, that is, the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, requires the actual commission of two racketeering acts, in order to prove a RICO conspiracy, the government must prove that two of these acts either were committed or were intended to be committed as part There is no requirement in Count One, the of the conspiracy. RICO conspiracy, that the following predicate offenses were

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actually committed by anyone.

Several of the charged categories of predicate offenses charge a violation of more than one specific law. order to find that a given predicate offense was, in fact, an object of the RICO conspiracy, you need not find that the object of the conspiracy involved violations of all of the laws within each predicate act; rather, you need only find that the object of the conspiracy involved the violation of at least one of the specific laws. However, you must agree unanimously on which particular crime, if any, was the object of the charged RICO conspiracy.

The defendant is charged in Count One with being a member of a conspiracy engaged in racketeering activity involving murder and conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of New York State law. I have already instructed you on the elements of the substantive crimes, and you should follow my instructions here, as well.

The defendant is charged in Count One with being a member of a conspiracy engaged in racketeering activity involving extortion, in violation of federal law. I have already instructed you on the elements of this crime, and you should follow my instructions here, as well.

The defendant is charged in Count One with being a member of a conspiracy engaged in racketeering activity involving the operation of an illegal gambling business, in

violation of both federal law and New York State law, New York State Penal Law 225.10. I've already instructed you on the elements of these crimes, and you should follow my instructions here, as well. However, I want to caution you that although a violation of New York Penal Law Section 225.05 is one way, the government may prove the first element of the federal gambling law. That section cannot, on its own, constitute a predicate offense here; only a violation of federal law, that is, Section 1955 of the criminal code of the United States, can constitute a predicate act.

Finally, I turn to Count Three.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant committed the crimes charged in Counts Four and Five, you must acquit the defendant on Count Three. If, and only if, you find that the government has proven that the defendant committed a crime charged in either Count Four or Count Five do you proceed to consider Count Three.

Count Three of the indictment charges the defendant with violating Section 924(j)(1) of the criminal code of the United States. Section 924(j) refers to another section of the criminal code, Section 924(c). And Section 924(c) provides, in pertinent part, that, and I quote:

"Any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses a firearm, shall be guilty of a crime."

Section 924(j) provides, in pertinent part, that: "A person who, in the course of a violation of Subsection C, causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall, if the killing is a murder, as defined by statute, be quilty of a crime."

Now, Count Three of the indictment reads as follows:

On or about July 30th, 2004 -- oh, and I should tell
you, I have used "July 10th" several times inadvertently. I
have always meant July 30, which is the date in question in
Count Three and in the other counts that I charged you on.

So I'm going to read Count Three now.

"On or about July 30, 2004, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Xing Lin, also known as Ding Pa, the defendant, willfully and knowingly, during and in relation to crimes of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, namely, extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion, did use a firearm, and, in furtherance of such crime, did cause the death of a person through the use of a firearm, which killing is murder as defined in the criminal code of the United States. To wit, Lin directed another person to shoot Chan Qin Zhou inside a club in Queens, New York. And the other person did shoot Zhou, as well as two bystanders, Mei Ying Li, and another person, killing Zhou and Li, and wounding Victim 3, in violation of Sections 924(j)(1) and (2) of the United States Criminal Code."

Count Three of the indictment, which I've just read to you, charges the defendant with violating Section 924(j)(1) -- well, I have read you the language of those statutes.

In order to find the defendant guilty of Count Three, you must find that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following four elements:

First, that the defendant committed either the crime of violence charged in Count Four of the indictment, or the crime of violence charged in Count Five of the indictment.

That is the first essential element of the crime charged in Count Three.

Second, that the defendant knowingly used a firearm during and in relation to the commission of one of those crimes.

Third, that the defendant's conduct caused the death of Chan Qin Zhou and Mei Ying Li.

And, fourth, that the death of those persons qualifies as murder as I will define that term for you in a moment.

The first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant committed one of the crimes of violence charged in Count Four or Count Five of the indictment. I instruct you that extortion and extortion conspiracy are crimes of violence which can be prosecuted in a United States court. However, in order to find that the government has satisfied this element, you must find that the

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government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in fact, committed one of the crimes charged in either Count Four or Count Five. If you have a reasonable doubt about both Count Four and Count Five, you must acquit the defendant of the crime charged in Count Three.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of violence charged in either Count Four or Count Five, then you must consider the second element of Count Three.

To establish the second element, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly used or aided and abetted the use of a firearm during and in relation to the crime which you find the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A firearm is defined in Section 921(a)(3) of the United States Criminal Code to mean any weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. I instruct you that a gun is a firearm. To knowingly use a firearm means to use the firearm purposefully and voluntarily, and not by accident or mistake. Use of a firearm requires an active employment of the firearm by the person. Active employment means brandishing, displaying, referring to a firearm so that others present knew the defendant had the firearm available, and, of course, firing or attempting to fire a firearm.

The government must establish that the defendant used

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the firearm during and in relation to the commission of a crime charged in this indictment of which you have found the defendant quilty beyond a reasonable doubt; here, extortion or extortion conspiracy. The circumstances surrounding the presence of the firearm must suggest that the defendant intended to have a firearm available for use during the commission of the underlying crime.

And the third element of Count Three is that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct caused the death of a person.

The indictment charges that, as Count Three charges, the defendant caused the death of Chan Qin Zhou and Mei Ying Li. A defendant's conduct may be found to cause the death of a person if it had such an effect in producing that person's death as to lead a reasonable person to regard the defendant's conduct as a cause of the death. The death of a person may have one or more than one cause. You need not find that the defendant shot the victim or that he committed the final fatal The government need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in causing the victim's death.

Now, in considering Count Three, you should apply the following definition of "murder," which comes from Section 1111 of the criminal code of the United States.

And I quote: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a

human being with malice aforethought. It includes murder that is committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate any murder.

If you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of Count Three, you should proceed to consider another legal theory of criminal liability that is called aiding and abetting.

In Count Three of the indictment, the defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to the crimes charged in Counts Four and Five, namely, extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. If the defendant did not himself commit a crime, but aided and abetted the commission of the crime by others, the defendant may be found guilty of the crime.

The aiding and abetting statute, Section 2 of the federal criminal code, reads as relevant here as follows:

"Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principle."

Under this statute, it is not necessary for the government to show that the defendant performed the act with which he is charged in order for you to find him guilty. A person who aids and abets another to commit an offense is just as guilty of that offense as if he had committed it himself.

Accordingly, you may find the defendant guilty of Count Three

if you find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that another person actually committed the offense with which the defendant is charged, and that the defendant aided or abetted that person in the commission of the offense.

As you can see, the first requirement is that you find that another person has committed the crime charged.

Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting a criminal act of another if no crime was committed by the other in the first place. But if you do find that a crime was committed, then you must consider whether the defendant aided and abetted the commission of the crime.

In order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associate himself in some way with the crime, and that he willfully and knowingly seek by some act to help make the crime succeed. The mere presence of the defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. An aider and abettor must have some interest in the criminal venture.

To determine whether the defendant aided or abetted the commission of Count Three, ask yourself these questions:

One. Did the defendant participate in the crime

charged as something he wished to bring about?

Two. Did the defendant associate himself with the criminal venture knowingly and willfully?

Three. Did the defendant seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed?

If the answers to each of these questions is yes, then the defendant is an aider and abettor. If the answer to any of these questions is no, the defendant is not an aider or abettor.

As to all elements of the crimes, except venue, the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to venue only, the government meets its burden of proof if it establishes that it is more likely than not that an act in furtherance of the crime you are considering occurred in the Southern District of New York. In this case, the government and the defendant have agreed that venue is proper in this district for each of the crimes charged.

The law requires only substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof. That is sufficient. With respect to the dates mentioned in the indictment, the same principle applies.

For example, the indictment charges that the RICO conspiracy in Count One existed from 1996 up to and including December of 2009. The indictment charges that the extortion conspiracy in Count Five existed from March of 2002 up to and

including December of 2009. It's not essential that the government prove that the conspiracy started and ended on those specific dates. It's enough if you find that, in fact, a conspiracy was formed, and existed for some time within that period. The law requires only a substantial similarity between the dates alleged in the indictment and the dates established by the evidence.

You are the sole judges of all of the questions of fact submitted to you and of the credibility of the witnesses. Your authority, however, is not to be exercised arbitrarily; it must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion, and in accordance with the rules of law that I give you. You may not speculate.

In making your determination of the facts in this case, your judgment must be applied only to that which is properly evidence. The sworn testimony of the witnesses is evidence. The documents and exhibits actually received in evidence are evidence. Exhibits marked for identification, but not received, are not evidence, nor are materials brought forth to refresh a witness's recollection. Stipulations, that is, agreements between counsel that certain facts are true, constitute evidence, and you must regard such agreed facts as true.

There are two types of evidence that you may properly use in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

One type of evidence is called direct evidence.

Direct evidence is the testimony of a witness about a fact in dispute that the witness saw, heard, touched, or tasted.

Direct evidence can also be a document that self-establishes a fact in this view.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence that does not directly prove a fact in dispute, but that permits a reasonable inference or conclusion that a fact exists or that a fact does not exist. That is all there is to circumstantial evidence.

You infer on the basis of reason and experience and common sense from an established fact the existence or nonexistence of some other fact.

Circumstantial evidence has the same weight as direct evidence. Federal law does not distinguish between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that before convicting a defendant, a jury must be satisfied of that defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from all of the evidence in the case.

Now, what is not evidence?

The indictment, as I've already told you, is not evidence. Testimony that has been stricken or excluded is not evidence, and may not be considered by you in any way in rendering a verdict. The lawyers' questions are not evidence. It is the witnesses' answers that are the evidence, not the questions. And you may not treat the questions as evidence.

Arguments by lawyers are not evidence, because the lawyers are not witnesses. What they've said to you in their opening statements and in their summations is intended to help you understand the evidence to reach your verdict. However, if your recollection of the evidence differs from the lawyers' statements about the evidence, it is your recollection that controls.

So, too, you must not take the rulings that I have made during the trial as an indication of my view as to what your decision should be.

I should also say that counsel not only have the right, but also are under a duty, to present whatever legal objections there may be to the admissibility of evidence. Counsel also have the right to ask for conferences at the bench out of the hearing of the jury. These deal with questions of law which I alone must decide. You should not draw any inferences because counsel asks for a conference with the Court at the bench out of the hearing of the jury.

You are being called upon to resolve the factual issues in this case. You will have to now decide where the truth lies. And a part of that decision will involve making judgments about the testimony of the witnesses you have listened to and observed. In making those judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified,

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prior inconsistent statements, if any, and any other matter in evidence that may help you to decide the truth and the significance of each witness's testimony.

There is no magic formula by which you should evaluate testimony. You bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves the reliability or unreliability of statements made to you by others. The same tests that you use in your everyday dealings are the tests you should apply in your deliberations. These tests apply to all the witnesses.

For example, the fact that a witness is a law enforcement officer does not in itself make that witness more or less credible than any other witness. You should size up each witness individually. The manner in which the witness gave testimony on the stand, the opportunity that the witness had to observe the facts about which the witness testified, the probability or improbability of the witness's testimony when viewed in light of all of the other evidence in the case, all these are factors you should take into consideration in determining the weight, if any, you should -- that you will assign to a witness's testimony.

Your decision whether or not to believe a witness may depend on how that witness impressed you. Was the witness candid, frank, and forthright, or did it seem as if the witness

was hiding something, being evasive in some manner? How did
the witness's manner on direct examination compare with the
witness's manner on cross-examination? Was the witness's
testimony consistent or was it contradictory? Did the witness
appear to know what the witness was talking about? And did the
witness strike you as someone who was trying to report
knowledge accurately?

If you find that any witness has deliberately testified falsely as to any material issue in this case, you may disregard all or any material -- or whatever part of that witness's testimony you choose. How much you choose to believe a witness may be influenced by the witness's bias or interest. Does the witness have a relationship with the government or the defendant that may have affected how the witness testified? Does the witness have some incentive or motive that might have caused the witness to shade the truth? Or does the witness have some bias, prejudice, or hostility that may have caused the witness consciously or not to give you something other than a completely accurate account of the facts testified to?

Even if a witness is impartial, you should consider whether the witness had an opportunity to observe the facts testified about. Ask yourselves whether the witness's knowledge and recollection of the facts stand up in light of all the other evidence.

In other words, what you must do in deciding

credibility is to size up each witness in light of that person's knowledge and demeanor, prior inconsistent statements, if any, the explanations given, and in light of all the other evidence in the case, just as you would in any important matter.

In deciding what to believe, remember that you should use your common sense, your good judgment, and your experience. There is no legal requirement that the government must investigate or prove its case through any particular means or use any particular investigative technique. All of the investigative techniques used in this case were lawful. Use of evidence obtained pursuant to searches is lawful.

Your approval or disapproval of the techniques used or of the fact that particular techniques were not used is not to enter into your deliberations. Your duty is to determine whether or not based on your evaluation of the evidence before you, the guilt of the defendant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the ultimate issue for your determination.

Evidence has been presented about some persons not on trial here, including persons the government contends are co-conspirators. You may not speculate about the reasons why any person is not named as a defendant in the indictment or is not on trial before you here. These matters have no bearing on the issues before you.

In this case, the defendant decided not to testify.

Under our Constitution, every criminal defendant has a right not to testify at trial. You may not draw any adverse inference against the defendant because he did not take the witness stand. You may not consider this against the defendant in any way in your deliberations in the jury room.

You've heard the testimony of witnesses who have testified about a grant of immunity from the Court or who have been promised by the government in written agreements that in consideration for their truthful testimony and cooperation with the government, they will not be prosecuted for any crimes which they may have committed either here in court or in interviews with the prosecutors.

With respect to both categories of witnesses, what this means is that the testimony of the witness may not be used against the witness in any criminal procedure, in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the immunity order of this Court.

You are instructed that the government is entitled to call as a witness a person who has been granted immunity. You may convict a defendant on the basis of such a witness's testimony alone if you find that the testimony proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the testimony of a witness who has been granted immunity by the

Court should be examined by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. You should scrutinize it closely to determine whether or not it is colored in such a way as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witness's own interests or such a witness confronted with the realization that he can win his own freedom by helping to convict another as a motive to falsify his testimony. Such testimony should be scrutinized by you with greater care, and you should act upon it with caution. If you believe it to be true and determine to accept the testimony, you may give it such weight, if any, that you believe it deserves.

You should ask yourselves whether a witness would benefit more by lying or by telling the truth. Was the witness's testimony made up in any way because the witness believed or hoped that he would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely?

The charge says "she," but really it should be "he."

So when you get to this part of the charge, keep in mind that that's just a typographical error, because all of the witnesses were he's.

Was the witness's testimony made up in any way because the witness believed or hoped that he would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely, or did the witness believe that the witness's interests would be best served by testifying truthfully? If you believe that the witness was

motivated by hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one which would cause the witness to lie, or was it one which would cause the witness to tell the truth?

These are all matters for you to consider. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case, and to reach a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the instructions that I have given and will give you, without resorting to speculation, conjecture, or surmise.

The government, to prevail on a count charged in the indictment, must prove the elements of that count beyond a reasonable doubt as I've already explained to you. If the government succeeds, your verdict should be guilty. If the government fails, your verdict must be not guilty. You must consider each charge separately and return a separate verdict as to each count as shown on the verdict form that I will give you. To report a verdict as to any count, all jurors must agree. Your verdict must be unanimous.

Under your oath as jurors, you may not permit the punishment of the defendant, if convicted, to enter into your deliberations or to influence your verdict in any way. Your duty is to decide the case solely upon the evidence. It is my duty — and my duty alone — to impose whatever punishment I determine is prescribed by law.

Now is the time that each of you should exchange your views with your fellow jurors. That is the very purpose of

jury deliberations: To discuss and consider the evidence, to listen to the arguments of fellow jurors, to present your individual views, to consult with one another, and to reach an agreement based solely on the evidence, if you can do so, without doing harm to your own individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, after consideration with your fellow jurors of the evidence in the case. But you should not hesitate to change an opinion that, after discussion with your fellow jurors, appears erroneous in light of the discussion and viewed against the evidence and the law. However, if, after carefully considering all the evidence and arguments of your fellow jurors, if you entertain a conscientious view that differs from others, you are not to yield your position simply because you are outnumbered or outweighed.

I further instruct you that you should deliberate without sympathy or prejudice as to any party. The law does not permit jurors to be governed by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion. Both the accused and the public expect that you will carefully and impartially consider all the evidence in the case, follow the law as stated by me, and reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.

Now, I am going to ask Juror No. 1, Michael McDonald, to act as foreperson. The foreperson will chair your meeting. But the foreperson's vote carries no greater weight during your

deliberations than that of any other juror.

When you begin your deliberations, a copy of this charge and a verdict form will be sent into the jury room with you. You will also receive a copy of the indictment. You may request that any exhibit be sent to you in the jury room; that is, any exhibit that has been received in evidence. If it is necessary during the course of your deliberations, you may also request that particular testimony be read back to you. But please remember that it's not always easy to locate the particular testimony that you want to hear. So be as specific as you possibly can.

After receiving your request, I must consult with the lawyers and consider their views on which portion of the transcript would respond to your request. As you can see, this is a time-consuming process, so please be patient and do not expect an immediate response.

If you have a question or wish to send a message to me during deliberations, put it in writing and have the foreperson sign it, then give the note to the marshal, who will be outside your door, and who will relay it to me. I will respond to you as promptly as I can either in writing or by calling you into the courtroom so I can address you orally.

When you communicate with me, if you are divided, never state or specify your numerical division at the time.

When you have reached a verdict as to each count,

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please complete the verdict form and give it to the marshal, who will relay it to me.

I now have the unpleasant task of separating the alternate jurors. I say that because Ms. Lamboy, Mr. Silber, Ms. Miller, and Mr. Gica sat and very patiently heard everything. And I regret that you cannot be part of the final deliberations, but our system would not work if we did not make arrangements for alternates. However, I cannot excuse you entirely, because of the unpredictability of human affairs. Please be sure that Mr. Daniels has the telephone number at which you can be reached, because it may be necessary to call you back to participate in deliberations. For that reason, I'm going to ask you to continue to follow my instructions not to discuss this case with anyone until after a verdict has been reached.

Thank you for being with us, and thank you for the very close attention which you have given to everything during the trial. You have performed a very important civic duty, and the community is grateful to you.

Now we can swear in the marshal.

(Marshal sworn)

THE COURT: All right. I will give you to take with you into the jury room copies of my charge, copies of the indictment. I will mark one copy of my charge as Court Exhibit I will also give you a verdict sheet which the foreperson

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will fill out when you have reached a verdict.

Now, everyone must be hungry. So the first thing that will happen when you go to the jury room is you will get lunch.

You may now all retire to the jury room.

(At 1:23 p.m., the jury retired to deliberate)

THE COURT: We will be in recess until 2:30, but -I'm sorry, until 3 o'clock. But I do require that one
representative of each side be present in the courtroom in the
event that we hear from the jury in the interim.

Now, I'm going to excuse all of you for lunch for an hour, in any event.

MS. BURNS: Thank you.

THE COURT: But after that, I need to have a representative of each side in the courtroom as long as the jury is deliberating.

MR. COHEN: I'm assuming, your Honor, for the defense, that's going to be me.

THE COURT: I'm not surprised.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SKINNER: Your Honor, there was one small issue with the charge.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SKINNER: Something that probably should have been taken out yesterday that I think we all missed.

On Page 60, there's a reference to informal immunity written agreements from the government that would be

nonprosecution agreements. There weren't any nonprosecution agreements in this case. To avoid any confusion as to what's meant, and because we excised any references to nonprosecution agreements elsewhere, I propose that you simply send the jurors a brief note indicating that this language occurs, and that you should disregard it because there were no such written agreements.

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. COHEN: And, your Honor, I would request, if your Honor is inclined to send in such a note, you include in it that jurors may base their verdict on the evidence as you previously told them.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.

MR. COHEN: I'm sorry, your Honor.

If your Honor is inclined to send in a note to the jury with Mr. Skinner's request on it, which, of course, I don't object to, I would ask also that you include in it that the jury may base their verdict on the evidence or on the lack of evidence.

THE COURT: I did say that.

MR. COHEN: You said it once. But I think there were probably seven or eight times that you said "on the evidence," without saying "lack of evidence."

And my other request, then -- I'm sorry I didn't pick up on this earlier -- is that your Honor --

THE COURT: It's just too complicated and too late. We should have picked that up at the charge conference.

MR. COHEN: And my other request is that your Honor instruct the jury that prior inconsistent statements are not admitted for their truth, but only as to the credibility of the witness. I think that's a crucial instruction.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. COHEN: I actually thought it was in there.

THE COURT: What is it that you're talking about?

MR. COHEN: Well, when your Honor told the jury in assessing the credibility of a witness they can consider, among other things, prior inconsistent statements that the witness may have made, I think that your Honor should also instruct the jury that those prior inconsistent statements were not introduced for the truth of those statements, but, rather, only as to assess the credibility of the witness.

THE COURT: Well, what prior inconsistent statements are you talking about? Are you really talking about the absence from some prior questioning of the answers that were given here; isn't that right?

MR. COHEN: There were some.

THE COURT: What is the clearest inconsistent statement you're talking about? That was a generalized charge;

I didn't really have in mind --

MR. COHEN: What Mr. Lin was alleged to have said when

he came into the room with Little Beijing, which is really the crucial issue I see in this case.

And I think it's essential that the jury understand that what's been said in the past is not offered for its truth, but only as to assess the credibility of the witness.

MR. SKINNER: Your Honor, prior inconsistent statements are not hearsay; they are carved out of the meaning of Rule 801. I don't think that the proposed instruction is correct on the law, I think it's confusing, and I think it's unnecessary.

THE COURT: I don't think it will help the jury's deliberations at this stage.

Very well. But I will --

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MR. COHEN: To the extent it's necessary, I'll note my exception.

THE COURT: Of course. I assume that anything I do not grant -- any request I do not grant you except to.

MR. SKINNER: Your Honor, we're excused until 2:30 for lunch, just so I know what time to be back?

THE COURT: 2:30.

MR. SKINNER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: But just let's agree on the language I'm sending the jury.

MR. SKINNER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Actually, I don't think it's appropriate

for me to send anything to the jury. It is the jury's 1 recollection that governs. And if they think there was any 2 3 such thing here, they can consider it. And if they don't think 4 so, they will not consider it. MR. SKINNER: Okay, your Honor. 5 6 THE COURT: Very well. 7 MR. SKINNER: Trying to avoid confusion, but --THE COURT: I understand. I would like to avoid 8 9 confusion always, but I don't want to create confusion. 10 MR. SKINNER: I mean I think in the charge it says "you've heard this," so that might create some confusion, 11 because it's coming from the Court. 12 13 THE COURT: You have heard what? 14 MR. SKINNER: It says: "You have heard testimony of 15 witnesses who have been made promises by the government." So I think it's a little confusing, because then they 16 17 wonder, Well, which witnesses received those informal -- I 18 quess it says informal. THE COURT: Excuse me? 19 20 MR. SKINNER: Your Honor, I take back what I was just 21 saying. I understand the Court's ruling. 22 THE COURT: Very well. Because I don't think it says 23 exactly what you think, but that's --

I think I agree with what you're saying.

MR. SKINNER: No, I was just rereading it myself, and

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               (At 1:30 p.m., a note was received from the jury)
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               THE COURT: Yes, you discovered it didn't say that.
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               Fine.
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               THE COURT: I have just received a note from the jury
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      which I will mark exhibit Court Exhibit 2, which reads as
      follows:
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               We, the jury, request all exhibits received into
      evidence (both gov. and defense).
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               We also request a list of witness names as they
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      appeared. I can't read this word. Is this "here"? As they
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      appeared here in court for direct examination.
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               MR. COHEN: Does anybody have a view on whether
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      nicknames should be included, since I referred to them all, for
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      simplicity during my summation, by their nicknames?
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               MS. BURNS: I think that probably makes sense, as I
      did the same with a couple of the witnesses.
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               THE COURT: Fine.
               MS. BURNS: They actually acknowledged --
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               THE COURT: Where they gave it, the nickname, sure.
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               MS. BURNS:
                          Right.
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               THE COURT: That's fine.
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               Anthony, we're going to mark this Court Exhibit 2.
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               (Luncheon recess)
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1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 3:00 3 THE COURT: I have given you a note that I received 4 from the jury. Have you both read it? 5 MS. BURNS: We have. 6 We have read two notes, your Honor. MR. COHEN: 7 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. One of them is much easier than the other. 8 9 MR. COHEN: Yes, indeed. 10 THE COURT: Now, what are the police reports that 11 we're talking about? Is any of this in evidence? 12 MR. COHEN: I don't believe so. 13 THE COURT: I didn't think so. I thought it was 14 brought out for refreshing recollection. 15 MS. BURNS: I think the note indicates they have the stipulation that refers to those reports and the times that 16 17 they were taken. You see the times are reflected in the note. 18 They may think they are in evidence, but they are not. We 19 don't have a disagreement. 20 MR. COHEN: There is one police report that is in 21 evidence. 22 THE COURT: What is that? 23 MR. COHEN: It was of the shooting and stabbing on 24 Division Street. That is in evidence. 25 MS. BURNS: That is the defendant's police report.

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They are asking for the statements of the eyewitnesses.
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                          How do you know?
               THE COURT:
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               MS. BURNS:
                          They lists.
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               THE COURT: Yes, you are right. Those are all the
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      statements of witnesses?
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               MS. BURNS: That's right. They were the three
 7
      individuals.
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               THE COURT:
                          Who went to the police station?
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               MS. BURNS:
                          That's right.
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               THE COURT: Those are not in evidence?
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               MS. BURNS:
                          They are not.
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               MR. COHEN:
                          Can I confer with Mr. Daniels for a
13
     moment?
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               THE COURT:
                           Sure.
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               (Pause)
               THE COURT: The next thing we have is can the victim
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      of an extortion be a coconspirator to the same extortion?
               Does either of you have any idea what this means?
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               MS. BURNS: The only extortion that is charged is the
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      extortion of the bus company owners. The bus company owners
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      they heard about are both Chen Quo Guang or and Yi Qun, the
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     murder victim. So from the note I don't really know which or
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     both of them they are asking about. I didn't think there is
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      any evidence that either of them was a coconspirator. I think
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they were both --

1	THE COURT: To the same extortion.
2	MS. BURNS: Right. It's the only extortion at issue
3	in the case.
4	THE COURT: There certainly was testimony that
5	initially somebody went to Mr. Lin and asked for his help in
6	calling off somebody's effort.
7	MS. BURNS: Efforts to compete in the company. That
8	was Chen.
9	MR. COHEN: That is what I thought it was a reference
10	to.
11	THE COURT: Right. But when was Chen a victim?
12	MS. BURNS: Our argument is he was subsequently
13	extorted by the defendant when the defendant asked for
14	additional shares in the company.
15	THE COURT: You call that extortion?
16	MS. BURNS: That's our extortion count.
17	MR. COHEN: Judge, I think there may be a stipulation
18	that was received in evidence that did not go into the jury
19	room. I am trying to find it.
20	THE DEPUTY CLERK: No. It went in.
21	MR. COHEN: I am sorry. I saw the one for Ng and
22	Varian. I didn't see the one for Ming Li. It was a government
23	exhibit. It was Government Exhibit 110.
24	THE DEPUTY CLERK: It's in there believe me.
25	MR. COHEN: Okay. Attached to it was Government

1 Exhibit 34.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes. Those are in evidence. They all went inside.

THE COURT: How would that be the same extortion anyhow?

MR. COHEN: Judge, that was the only thing I could think of in trying to think like a layman about what they might be talking about and who among the players might be considered a coconspirator in an extortion was that if the jury thought that Mr. Lin and Chen, the government's alleged extortion victim agreed to somehow use force to keep the other guy out of the business, the competitor, that is that they are referring to.

MS. BURNS: The note is very unclear.

MR. COHEN: I don't know how to answer the question. Maybe your Honor can ask the jury to be more specific and to clarify exactly what it is that they want. That would be my request.

THE COURT: Who is the victim of the extortion supposed to be according to the government?

 $\,$ MS. BURNS: Chen and Yi Qun, or his legal name is Zhou, the victim of the murder.

THE COURT: I am not talking about the murder.

MS. BURNS: Right. But both of them were part of the same bus company that was extorted and the charge and the

indictment both read that in their to wit clause that the
people extorted were the owners of a bus company and those are
the owners that they have heard about in the course of the
testimony.

MR. COHEN: I think in the context of the testimony
the only person they could only be referring to is Chen.

THE COURT: I think that's right, but that doesn't answer the question. I think the closest I can come is can someone who was helped by the extorter be considered a victim.

MR. COHEN: That may be it, Judge, but rather than speculate, my request is that your Honor ask them to be more clear.

THE COURT: I will. I am going to say I do not understand your question about a coconspirator being a victim. Please be more specific.

MR. COHEN: Thank you.

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MS. BURNS: Thank you, Judge.

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, with respect to the other note, are you going to tell them that the police reports are just not in evidence and they cannot see them.

THE COURT: Yes. I will read you what I write in a minute. I just want to send the first one in.

MR. COHEN: Sure.

THE COURT: Were those police reports brought forth to refresh recollection?

1 MR. COHEN: Yes.

THE COURT: I am going to say the police reports are not in evidence. They were only used to refresh recollection.

MS. BURNS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Very well. I take it you approve of that, Mr. Cohen.

MR. COHEN: Yes.

(Recess pending verdict)

THE COURT: In the Lin case we now have a response from the jury. On page 16 of the charge it states "that the defendant agreed to work with at least one other person in furtherance of the object charged." In the indictment it states that the owners of the bus company are the victims. In this one, Quo Quang Chen was one victim. Can he also be the other person stated in the charge?

MR. SKINNER: Can't be the coconspirator working with.

THE COURT: This explains why they say how can he both be the victim and the coconspirator.

MR. COHEN: That supposes I think that the extortion victim is somebody other than who the government says is it.

MR. SKINNER: Not necessarily.

THE COURT: No. It says in this case Quo Quang Chen was one victim. Can he also be the "other person" stated in the charge? They quote from the charge "that the defendant agreed to work with at least one other person in furtherance of

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the object charged." The defendant agreed to work with him to
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      get his friend to not extort him.
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                          I think we both agree the answer is no.
               MR. COHEN:
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               MS. BURNS:
                           No.
               THE COURT: Is Quo Guang Chen an owner of a bus
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      company?
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               MR. COHEN:
                          Yes.
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               MS. BURNS:
                          He is.
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               MR. COHEN: He is the person that the government
      alleges is the extortion victim.
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               THE COURT: I understand.
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               MR. COHEN:
                          He was the owner of a bus company.
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                          Well, who is the other person?
               THE COURT:
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               MR. COHEN: The other person could be the
      coconspirators at the park. It could be the person engaged in
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      the murder in the karaoke room with the defendant on his
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      orders. I think we should probably just instruct them, No, you
     must find that the defendant worked with someone other than Quo
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      Quang Chen in furtherance of the extortion to be an extortion
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      conspiracy.
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               THE COURT:
                          How can they?
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               MR. COHEN:
                           There is none.
23
               MR. SKINNER: There is.
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               THE COURT: What is the evidence?
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               MR. SKINNER: There were two followers in the Corona
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Park, Queens that met with the defendant when the defendant 1 threatened the victim, Quo Guang Chen and one of them touched 2 3 his side gesturing to the gun. 4 THE COURT: There is no basis that the jury could find 5 that the --6 MR. SKINNER: I am not saying that is the same person. 7 I am saying someone he worked with. 8 MR. COHEN: Judge, I think the simplest, most direct 9 and least prejudicial answer is to simply say no. The question 10 calls for a yes or no answer. I think the answer is no. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 MR. COHEN: Judge, I will note for the record that for 13 all the notes that have come up to now, I would waive Mr. Lin's 14 presence and I will decide on a note by note basis. 15 THE COURT: He has to waive his appearance. I will consult with him. 16 MR. COHEN: 17 THE COURT: Go ahead. He is right inside here. 18 (Pause) 19 THE COURT: This is what I propose to writing. 20 You talked to Mr. Lin? 21 MR. COHEN: I did. 22 THE COURT: What did he say? 23 MR. COHEN: He said that he is very satisfied to have 24 waived his presence for the notes that have been discussed up

until now, but he would like to be present for any future notes

that come out.

THE COURT: Very well. What I propose to tell the jury is a person cannot be both a coconspirator and a victim of an extortion. I was just reading the response.

MS. BURNS: That sounds good. Thank you, your Honor. (Pause)

THE COURT: Request for testimony read back.

MR. COHEN: I am sorry, Judge?

THE COURT: I was going to read a new note that I just received, request for testimony read back. Quo Guang Chen's discussion on direct examination regarding a phone conversation with the defendant when Mr. Chen stated that he would not pay \$2,000 to the defendant. We request to know his — in regard to this entire phone call and related cross—examination. To know his testimony in regard.

Also, is Quo Guang Chen's testimony regarding the phone call with the defendant after the murder.

Do we have the transcript?

MR. SKINNER: I can find the direct testimony. I am not sure if Mr. Cohen crossed him on this or not. I will have to look it up, Judge.

THE COURT: The question clearly they have a pretty good recollection what happened, but I think they actually combined two things together. The phone called concerned a request for an additional 10 percent of the company and then it

was the following day at the meeting in Corona Park, Queens 1 when he actually then agreed to give him \$2,000. 2 3 Should we pull the testimony just for the phone call 4 or both? 5 MR. COHEN: I think the jury should get what it asks 6 for. 7 Testimony read back of Quo Guang THE COURT: Yes. Chen's discussion on direct examination regarding a 8 9 conversation with the defendant. I can't read the middle word. 10 Mr. Chen's stated that he would not pay \$2,000 to the 11 defendant. We request to hear his testimony in regard to this 12 entire phone call and the related cross-examination. 13 Also, Quo Guang Chen's testimony regarding the phone 14 call with the defendant after the murder. 15 MR. SKINNER: The testimony with regard to the phone call starts on page 322 at line 8 and it includes a rough time 16 frame, which I think should answer the jury's question whether 17 it was before or after the murder. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. SKINNER: Your Honor, how do you do read backs? 21 THE COURT: I am going to bring them into the

MR. SKINNER: Do you want to us prepare the transcripts, or do you have the court reporter read it back omitting the objections? Logistically I have never done it

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courtroom.

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before.

THE COURT: I see. It works in different ways. I can just take a page of the transcript and expurgate everything that doesn't apply to it. That is one way of doing it.

MR. SKINNER: Probably the easiest.

THE COURT: On a discreet matter it is probably the easiest.

MR. SKINNER: We'll give you the pages and line numbers that apply.

THE COURT: If you hand it up, I will know. We'll make a copy.

MS. BURNS: Your Honor, may we see the note recording the two phone calls?

THE COURT: Yes, of course.

MS. BURNS: Thank you.

MR. COHEN: I have it on my lap top. What page?

MR. SKINNER: They are talking about the phone call at 339.

Are you going to read it or the reporter?

THE COURT: We're going to send it in.

MR. COHEN: With redactions and objections and things?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. SKINNER: Let's agree on the page numbers and page number.

THE COURT: That's fine.

1 (Recess pending verdict) MR. COHEN: We're going to go down to the command 2 3 center, agree on the transcript. 4 MR. SKINNER: We agreed on the applicable pages and 5 lines. 6 THE COURT: That's fine. 7 MR. COHEN: I don't want to be responsible for it so I am going to hand the note and envelope that it came in back to 8 9 the clerk. 10 THE COURT: Absolutely. You should do that. 11 (Recess pending verdict) THE COURT: I have received another note from the 12 13 This is a very actively writing jury. Request for 14 testimony to read back Huo Guang Chen's testimony from the 15 Corona Park incident. There were several times this was mentioned. We request all the testimony. 16 17 Mr. Burns, have you heard the note? 18 MS. BURNS: I have. THE COURT: I wasn't looking in that direction. 19 20 MR. SKINNER: We heard it. We will gather that. 21 MS. BURNS: We have the other testimony ready. 22 THE COURT: That has been agreed to? 23 MR. COHEN: Yes, your Honor. We agreed to what is 24 I've looked at the redactions. I have approved them and

we're ready to send them in when you are.

THE COURT: Very well. We'll give them to 1 Mr. Daniels. 2 3 MR. SKINNER: We'll get to work on the next one. 4 THE COURT: If you would like to read it, you are 5 welcome to. We're mark it Court Exhibit 11. 6 (Recess pending verdict) 7 THE COURT: We have one more jury note, which I would like to answer in the affirmative. Can we go home now? Can we 8 9 have the room open at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow? I have ascertained 10 that both Mr. Daniels and the marshal will be available at 9:00 11 tomorrow morning. 12 MR. SKINNER: We will as well, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: We will continue deliberations to tell 14 them that. 15 MR. COHEN: I don't want to be heard, Judge. 16 THE COURT: They are going to continue their 17 deliberations. 18 MR. COHEN: Do you want us here at 9:00 as well? I think you have to be. 19 THE COURT: 20 MR. COHEN: Can the marshals have my client here? 21 MR. SKINNER: We can order him for 9:00. I am not 22 sure what time they can produce him, but we'll order him at 9:00. 23 24 THE COURT: Let's get the jury in and let's let them 25 go home.

(In open court; jury present)

THE COURT: Members of the jury, the answer to the question "Can we go home now" is yes and indeed you should be here to continue your deliberations at 9:00 tomorrow morning. But I should tell you that all of you have to be here in order to deliberate, which means that you may not begin your deliberations until everybody is in the jury room. That means that you all are responsible to each other to get here at 9:00 in the morning for a follow-up question on that.

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: Can some of us come early, they would spend more time reading the indictment and charge.

THE COURT: I don't know if anybody is going to be here to guard the room.

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: I mean at 9:00 in the morning as opposed to beginning deliberations.

THE COURT: I see. Once you all gather, you can agree on whatever procedure you want to agree on in terms of how you are going to deliberate; but you should not hold up the whole group. If one of you has a question, you should present it to the group and there is no reason why the group cannot look at whatever it is that you have in there at the time that the issue arises. But you shouldn't all be working on different things. You should be concentrating on the verdict form and taking it in sequence because that is the way you will have a more orderly deliberation and a more likely to complete your

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D406LIN4 deliberation in an efficient fashion. Thank you all for your conscientious performance of a very important civic duty and you will continue again at 9:00 tomorrow morning. Have a pleasant evening. (Jury excused) THE COURT: Anything further? MR. COHEN: Not from the defendant. THE COURT: You are all excused. (Adjourned to April 25th at 9:00 a.m.)